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INTRODUCTION
The Revealed-Preferences Ranking methodology developed by
Professors Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. and Brian L. Frye purports to be an
“objective ranking” because it identifies the claimed preferences of first-year
law students by looking at and comparing the “quality” of the first-year
students who chose to attend each law school based on the LSAT and UGPA
indicators for the entering class at each law school.1 For The 2019 RevealedPreferences Ranking of Law Schools, the authors incorporate the preferences
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in
the Professions at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, Minnesota. I
am very grateful to Bernie Burk and Emma Rasiel, with whom I have discussed some aspects
of these issues over many months. I also am grateful to C.J. Ryan and Brian Frye for engaging
in a productive dialogue regarding some of my concerns with the Revealed-Preferences
Ranking, particularly in relation to the challenges associated with incorporating transfer in
data.
1. See Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, The 2019 Revealed-Preferences
Ranking of Law Schools, 7 BELMONT L. REV. 86, 87 (2019).
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of those who chose to transfer out from a given law school as a further
indication of how the preferences of transfer students inform the “quality” of
a given law school.2
While I appreciate the concept of trying to generate something that
can be identified as an objective ranking, I write to highlight two issues that
shroud the accuracy of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking as a general
matter: the failure to account for (1) the size of the entering class and (2) the
average net tuition paid by an entering class, both of which may skew the
results of the Revealed-Preference Ranking somewhat significantly. I also
comment briefly on the inclusion of “transfers out” as a further indicator of
preference, while applauding the authors for deciding to exclude “transfers
in” from their analysis given a number of issues with the use of the “transfer
in” data.
I. SIZE
Perhaps the most significant issue with the Revealed-Preferences
Ranking is its complete failure to account for the size of the class that is
enrolled at a given law school.
Assume that there were two law schools ranked equally in the 2018
Revealed-Preferences Ranking because they had exactly identical first-year
class profiles in Fall 2017, such that under the methodology described in the
Revealed-Preferences Ranking they came out with the same “score” or
“index.” To provide more context for this hypothetical, assume that both law
schools had the following LSAT and UGPA profiles: 165/162/158 and
3.75/3.6/3.4. If one school had 400 first-year students and the other school
had only 200 first-year students, should they actually be considered to be
equal in quality, or by the logic of the Revealed-Preferences Methodology,
shouldn’t the law school with the larger enrollment be viewed as stronger
because it in fact attracted more of the “best” students?
This “size” dilemma gets more complicated over time. What if, in
the 2019 Revealed-Preferences Ranking, these two law schools again had the
exact same LSAT and UGPA first-year class profiles in Fall 2018—
165/162/158 and 3.75/3.6/3.4—but the school with 400 first-year students in
Fall 2017 still had 400 first-year students while the school with 200 first-year
students in Fall 2017 now had only 180 first-year students? The 2019
Revealed-Preferences Ranking would still treat these two schools as being
identical even though one clearly did better in attracting the best students
than the other on a year-over-year basis.
Thus, my first critique is that, because the Revealed-Preferences
Ranking fails to account for the size of a given law school’s entering class in
any way, it creates potential anomalies in the rankings.

2.

Id. at 87–88.
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I recognize size can be a confounding factor. Some law schools
simply have different size operations. Harvard has had roughly 560 first-year
students for the last several years while Yale has had roughly 200 first-year
students for the last several years. Yale is designed to operate on a different
“scale” in terms of campus infrastructure and human resource capacity
(faculty and staff). Thus, the fact that Harvard attracts 560 of the strongest
students while Yale attracts roughly 200 of the strongest students should not
necessarily mean that Harvard is profoundly “better” than Yale simply
because a larger number of strong students chose to attend Harvard. But at
the same time, hypothetically, if, in a declining market, Harvard continues to
attract 560 of the strongest students while Yale attracts only 180 of the
strongest students in terms of LSAT and UGPA profile, then one could posit
that Harvard is “stronger” than Yale because a slightly larger percentage of
strong students year-over-year continued to choose Harvard over Yale.
Phrased differently, while I think that one of the foundational
premises of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking is accurate—that all law
schools are competing for the “best” students—they aren’t all competing for
the same number of the best students or for a growing market share of the
best students. Indeed, most law schools were operating at something of a
“steady-state” prior to the Great Recession, taking in roughly the same
number of first-year students year over year with only modest changes in
LSAT and UGPA profile year-over-year. The challenge between 2010 and
2015 was that the applicant pool shrank by roughly 38 percent (from roughly
88,000 to roughly 55,000) forcing law schools to make difficult choices.3
Most highly-ranked law schools, with a choice of giving up revenue (smaller
classes and/or lower average net tuition (discussed infra)) or profile, gave up
revenue to maintain profile.4 The relative attractiveness of a law school to
first-year students then would be better-measured by changes in relative
performance over time. This would take into account relative profile (how a
given law school’s profile compares with the profiles of other law schools
along with how its profile changed in comparison with changes in the profiles
of other law schools) as well as relative size (how much did one law school’s
first-year class size change in comparison with the first-year class sizes of
3. Archive: 2000-2015 ABA End-of-Year Summaries—Applicants, Admitted
Applicants & Applications, LSAC, https://www.lsac.org/archive-2000-2015-aba-end-yearsummaries-applicants-admitted-applicants-applications (last visited Aug. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/2Z48-63M6]. More significantly, the nature of the applicant pool also
changed, with a smaller percentage of applicants at the top end of the LSAT distribution and
a greater percentage of applicants from further down the LSAT distribution. Jerry Organ,
Changes in Composition of the LSAT Profiles of Matriculants and Law Schools Between 2010
and 2015, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Jan. 18, 2016), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
legalwhiteboard/2016/01/in-late-december-2014-i-posted-a-blog-analyzing-how-thedistribution-of-matriculants-across-lsat-categories-had-changed-si.html
[https://perma.cc/2C2E-DLPS].
4. Bernard A. Burk et al., Competitive Coping Strategies in the American Legal
Academy: An Empirical Study, 19 NEV. L.J. 583, 621 (2019).
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other law schools). The strongest law schools in such a ranking would be
those that had the strongest profiles and managed to increase profile and/or
size or minimize declines in profile and/or size.
II. AVERAGE NET TUITION
The other significant issue with the Revealed-Preferences Ranking
is its complete failure to account for average net tuition in any meaningful
way.
Assume that there were two law schools ranked equally in the 2018
Revealed-Preferences Ranking because they had exactly identical first-year
class LSAT and UGPA profiles in the Fall of 2017 such that under the
methodology described in the Revealed-Preferences Ranking they came out
with the same “score.” To provide more context for this hypothetical, assume
again that both law schools had the same LSAT and UGPA profiles noted
above: 165/162/158 and 3.75/3.6/3.4. Assume for this analysis that each law
school also enrolled 200 students in its first-year class. These two law schools
would seem to be identical and would appear to be appropriately ranked
equally in the 2018 Revealed-Preferences Ranking, given that the size of the
first-year class and the LSAT and UGPA profile of the first-year class are
identical.
But what if one law school attracted its 200 students with an average
net tuition after scholarships of $35,000, while the other law school attracted
its 200 students with an average net tuition of $25,000? Would you still
consider these two law schools to be equal, or would the logic of the
Revealed-Preferences Ranking suggest that the law school able to charge
$35,000 for the “best” students is actually more-preferred than the law school
that can only charge $25,000 to attract a comparable set of students?
This also becomes more complicated over time. Assume that in Fall
2017 (the base year for the 2018 Revealed-Preferences Ranking), both law
schools had 200 first-year students and the exact same LSAT and UGPA
profiles AND the exact same average net tuition (let’s assume both had an
average net tuition of $35,000 for the Fall 2017 entering class). Now assume
that in Fall 2018 (the base year for the 2019 Revealed-Preferences Ranking),
both law schools again had 200 first-year students and the exact same LSAT
and UGPA profiles, but that one law school was able to increase average net
tuition to $37,000 while the other saw average net tuition decline to $33,000.
The logic of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking methodology would suggest
these two law schools should still be ranked equally, but clearly one is
“stronger”—or better able to attract the “best” students—since the best
students are willing to pay more to go to one than the other.
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III. SIZE AND AVERAGE NET TUITION AS APPROPRIATE MEANS OF
MANAGING PROFILE
The failure to address size and average net tuition is a flaw in not just
the Revealed-Preferences Ranking, but in all of the other rankings that rely
on LSAT and UGPA profile as a component of the ranking—the U.S. News
Rankings, the Brophy Rankings, the Above the Law Rankings, etc.5
Going back for more than a decade, critics of the U.S. News rankings
have noted that a number of components of the rankings are subject to
manipulation, one of them being LSAT and UGPA profile.6 Prior to the
agreement between the ABA and the LSAC to have the LSAC “verify” the
LSAT and UGPA profiles of entering classes across law schools,7 some law
schools would try to improve the profile of the entering class in a variety of
ways. At one time, some law schools tried to shift students into part-time
programs so as to exclude them from the calculation of the LSAT and UGPA
profile which they reported based only on full-time students.8 At one time,
some law schools “rounded up” on UGPA.9 While these were perhaps
somewhat inappropriate ways to improve profile, there always have been two
entirely appropriate ways to try to improve or maintain profile—work with a
smaller class (so a school needs fewer strong students to generate the desired
LSAT and UGPA profile), and work on “buying” more strong students by
offering greater scholarships (and thereby reducing average net tuition).
Law schools have the ability to manipulate size and average net
tuition to craft profile and they have been doing so for some time. In the
article Competitive Coping Strategies in the American Legal Academy: An
Empirical Study,10 my co-authors and I demonstrated that among private law
schools, in the face of a declining applicant pool between 2010 and 2016,
most law schools accepted fewer students and/or decreased average net
tuition in an effort to maintain LSAT and UGPA profile (or minimize the
decline in LSAT and UGPA profile).11 For the vast majority of private law
schools that had some ability to control their own destiny, profile
preservation was a greater concern than revenue preservation, and profile

5. See Ryan & Frye, supra note 1, at 90–93 (discussing a variety of other ranking
systems).
6. For some criticisms of the U.S. News ranking, see id. at 91 n.12.
7. Paul Caron, LSAC to Verify Law School Admissions Data Reported to ABA, U.S.
NEWS, TAXPROF BLOG (June 12, 2012), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/06/
lsac-to-.html [https://perma.cc/RJP5-EQLE].
8. Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/us/education/the-878-million-maneuver.html
[https://perma.cc/6R66-YR2V] (describing use of part-time students to exclude students with
lower LSATs or UGPAs from reported profile).
9. Calculations for Class of 2010 on file with author.
10. See Burk et al., supra note 3.
11. Id. at 627–29.

2019]

REVIEW: THE REVEALED-PREFERENCES RANKING

119

preservation required many schools to reduce the size of their entering classes
AND to reduce their average net tuition.12
IV. SIZE IS WORKABLE—AVERAGE NET TUITION IS PROBLEMATIC
If one really wanted to construct an “objective” RevealedPreferences Ranking that more accurately described the extent to which one
law school was better able to attract “better” students than another law
school, the ranking would need to account for size in some way and would
need to account for average net tuition in some way.
The size information is readily available for all law schools13 and one
could look at relative changes in size over time along with changes in profile
in an effort to determine whether one school has a stronger ability to attract
the “best” students than another law school. This would be something of a
“market share” analysis where relative change in market share is the focus
more so than actual market share at a given point in time.
This analysis, however, also would be incomplete without some
engagement of data relating to average net tuition. The problem is that there
are multiple challenges with integrating average net tuition meaningfully into
such a ranking. The first challenge with respect to average net tuition is that
it is essentially impossible to calculate based on publicly-available
information for public law schools. Roughly 45 percent of law schools are
public law schools for which there generally are different tuition rates
charged to residents and non-residents. While the different tuition rates are
publicly available, what is not publicly available is the percentage of firstyear students who are residents compared to the percentage who are nonresidents. Although some schools voluntarily release this information, it is
not widely available across the universe of public law schools. Thus, one is
very hard-pressed to come up with a workable formula for calculating
average net tuition at public law schools (which would mean they would
likely have to be excluded from the rankings).
Moreover, what information is available about average net tuition is
only available on a one-year deferred basis and is not reported on the entering
class, but on the entire student body.14 Thus, an effort to integrate average net
tuition into a Revealed-Preferences Ranking would require that the ranking
for a given entering class be delayed until December of the following year
when the ABA releases the grants and scholarship information for the year
in which that class entered law school. Thus, for the 2019 RevealedPreferences Ranking drawing on the LSAT and UGPA profiles of the class
12. Id.
13. The ABA Standard 509 Report includes information on the size of the entering class.
See ABA Required Disclosures, ABA: SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
http://abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx (follow “509 Required Disclosures”
hyperlink, then search Standard 509 Reports by school and year) (last visited Aug. 11, 2019).
14. Id.
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that entered law school in Fall of 2018, the rankings could not be released
until early 2020 (after the grants and scholarship information for the 2018–
2019 academic year is made available in December 2019). In addition,
because the average net tuition calculations would be reported based on the
entire student body (rather than the entering class alone), it would be difficult
to determine with specificity how average net tuition changed for the entering
class of first-year students from one year to the next.
V. INTEGRATING TRANSFERS
The effort to incorporate transfers in the 2019 Revealed-Preferences
Ranking probably is a reasonable refinement, given that the authors
recognized the need to limit the analysis to transfers out from a given law
school.
Let me begin by acknowledging that the desire to incorporate
transfers into a ranking system designed to reflect law student preferences is
somewhat understandable given that transfers are expressing a preference.
Those students leaving one law school to go to another law school are
expressing a preference—they prefer the law school to which they are
transferring over the law school from which they are transferring. Thus, I
think it is reasonable to recognize that those law schools with fewer transfers
out are seen as preferable relative to those law schools with more transfers
out. Phrased differently, to the extent that the Revealed-Preferences Ranking
speaks to the preferences of students based on the quality of students
choosing to attend a given law school, the fact that a number of students
choose to transfer away from that law school suggests that the entering class
quality might slightly overstate the extent to which that law school is in fact
preferred.
The authors of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking wisely have
decided not to include “transfers in” in the calculations of their rankings. This
decision makes sense for a number of reasons. First, the foundational premise
of the analysis of preferences of first-years is that all law schools are
competing for the “best” first-year students. The challenge with trying to
incorporate “transfers in” as a meaningful indication of student preference is
that not all law schools are competing for transfer students. One of the biggest
problems with incorporating “transfers in” into a ranking analysis that
encompasses all law schools is that most law schools really are not
participating in the transfer market in any meaningful way. In the summer of
2018, there were 1,494 transfer students, but 1,020 of them went to 46 law
schools with ten or more transfers in. Less than one-quarter of law schools
accepted more than two-thirds of all transfers. By contrast, there were 24 law
schools with no transfers in, 30 law schools with one transfer in and 25 law
schools with two transfers in. These 79 law schools (nearly 40 percent of law
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schools), took in a total of 80 transfers, less than six percent of all transfers.15
Thus, law schools cannot be said to compete for transfers in the same manner
that they compete for first-year students.
But perhaps an even bigger problem with including transfers is that
it would reward a small subset of law schools with a “multiplier” effect. One
of the strategies for preserving profile over the last several years that some
law schools have pursued involved a concerted effort to accept a smaller
entering class (to preserve profile) while seeking to recoup lost revenue by
growing the number of transfers.16 The key consideration here is that the
LSAT and UGPA profile of transfer students are not incorporated into the
“profile” scoring done by U.S. News (or by the Revealed-Preferences
Ranking). Thus, because “size” has not been a factor in any of the rankings
systems, some law schools “gamed the system” by taking a smaller entering
class and maintaining (or minimizing declines in) profile, and then
welcoming a large number of transfer students (to the extent possible) to
recoup some or much of the lost revenue from their smaller first-year class
(with no impact on their ranking given that the LSAT and UGPA of transfers
are not accounted for in any of the rankings systems). To the extent that these
law schools preserved profile by reducing their entering class size, they
would be rewarded for their profile because size is not a factor in analyzing
profile. To the extent that they “attracted” more transfers than other law
schools, they would be rewarded again.
Moreover, there is no way based on existing available data to account
for the “quality” of the transfers in a meaningful way. Only law schools with
more than 12 transfers in are required to report the law schools from which
transfers were received and the 75th, 50th, and 25th first-year GPA profile
for the transfers.17 Thus, there is an incomplete data set for trying to assess
the “quality” of “transfers in.” Nonetheless, when one looks at the available
data—which focuses on law schools from whom transfers were received and
on first-year GPA at those law schools, it is pretty clear that the quality of
“transfers in” diminishes significantly once one moves down the rankings
chart from Harvard, to NYU, to Georgetown, and beyond.18 It is not a stretch
to assert that at many of these law schools, the transfer students represent
students who would not have been admitted in the first instance because they
would have diluted or diminished the seeming quality of the student body
based on entering class profile.
15. Id.
16. Jerry Organ, Better Understanding the Transfer Market, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Dec.
10, 2014), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2014/12/better-understandingthe-transfer-market.html [https://perma.cc/A779-J97E].
17. See ABA Required Disclosures, supra note 11.
18. Jerry Organ, 2018 ABA Data Show Continued Decline in Number and Percentage
of Transfers, TAXPROF BLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/
2018/12/2018-transfer-data-shows-continued-decline-in-number-and-percentage-oftransfers.html [https://perma.cc/G3UX-LUVH].
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CONCLUSION
The failure to account for the ability of law schools to manipulate
size and average net tuition to produce a law school first-year class with a
given LSAT and UGPA profile present significant “gaps” in terms of the
claim that the Revealed-Preferences Ranking accurately and objectively
measures the law school “preferences” of first-year law students who made
choices about where to attend law school. I would suggest that the authors of
the Revealed-Preferences Ranking at least acknowledge the significant
“margin of error” that is embedded in the Revealed-Preferences Ranking
given that it fails to account for size and average net tuition.

